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Background
Antecedents
In May 2005, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Radboud University started to 
explore avenues for collaboration on the theme of international migration which in the course of 
the final decade became an increasingly important policy theme, in relation to the need to deal 
with questions of integration (how to deal with migrants in Dutch society) and especially the 
incorporation of migration issues as a new element in the Dutch development cooperation policy, 
as well as in anticipation of participation of the Netherlands at the UN high- level dialogue on 14 
and 15 September 2006. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cognizant of the increasing growth rate of the world's 
migrant population, acknowledged the need to better understand the root causes of migration, and 
the need to contribute to policy formulation to optimise the link between (international) 
development and migration, in particular for the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (also from the 
perspective of achieving the millennium development goals). 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Research Group Migration and Development at 
Radboud University streamlined efforts which resulted in the initiation of a joint project 
‘International Migration and National Development: Viewpoints and Policy Initiatives in the 
Countries of Origin’ (see Zoomers and van Naerssen, report 1) under the coordination of the 
latter and financed by the former. In the course of the process, the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment also decided to participate and co-finance activities.The project, consisting of desk 
research, field missions and an international experts’ meeting, was carried out between May and 
December 2006.
Purpose and project activities
This project focuses on achieving a better understanding of the implications of international 
migration for national development from the perspective of the sending countries (with an 
emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa). More specifically, the purpose of the project is to explore (1) 
current perceptions - as seen from the perspective of the countries of origin - of the links between 
international migration and national development, and (2) current trends in policy making aimed 
at minimizing the negative effects, while optimizing the development impact. What are the 
dominant view and policy initiatives in the different countries of sub-Saharan Africa? It is 
concerned with the question of how a coherent international migration policy can contribute to 
the fight against poverty.
The project consists of desk research (policy documents, statistical analysis, interviewing 
diaspora organisations etc.), field missions to Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Kenya and 
Nigeria, and an international experts’ meeting with participants from a large number of countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America. The project was carried out by an international 
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demography) affiliated to various institutions (Radboud university Nijmegen, ASC, CEDLA, 
NIDI, Utrecht University, Oxford University and the Human Resources  Development Centre in 
Lagos, Nigeria). This team worked in close collaboration with policy makers of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. All the reports are available 
on the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.minbuza.nl) and the Radboud university 
(www.ru.nl). For a complete overview of the project output, see Annex 1.
Summary of the results
The characteristics of international labour migration 
Based on statistical sources and policy documents, we analysed the characteristics of 
international labour migration (see van Moppes 2006; Spaan and van Moppes 2006; Zoomers and 
van Naerssen 2006). 
The number of international labour migrants is currently estimated at between 175 and 
200 million, about 3 percent of the world population. If we try to obtain a picture of the direction 
of the international migration flows, we find that there is a limited number of dominant 
destinations, i.e. the classical immigration countries (the United States [US] and Canada), a 
number of countries on the Persian Gulf (such as Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Emirates) and, lastly, a number of European countries (France, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Spain and Italy). Thus from the perspective of the receiving regions there appears to be 
a situation in which the migration flows follow a relatively fixed pattern – migrants seem to move 
from the poor south towards the richer northern countries. These migration flows are often 
matched by a reversed flow of remittances (see Zoomers and van Naerssen; report 14) . 
If we look at international migration from the perspective of the sending countries, 
however, a different - more diverse - picture emerges. The majority of migration flows are found 
not to be directed towards the core receiving countries just referred to. Only a limited number of 
countries are characterised by South-North migration. By far the majority of emigration countries 
are found to be the subject of South-South migration; in other instances we encounter diasporic 
states (states with a large migrant population fanning out over many countries). 
· South-North Migration
Examples of countries with South-North migration directed at one of the above core regions 
include Mexico (to the US); Morocco (to France, Germany etc.); Senegal (to France or Spain); 
and/or Ecuador (Spain). It concerns a limited group of countries with a clearly structured flow 
towards specific receiving countries with, in the case of the EU, the majority of the migrants 
entering via Spain and Italy, and/or settling in the former mother country (colonial ties). 
· South-South Migration
In many countries - notably in sub-Saharan Africa – there is mainly South-South migration. 
These are often relatively poor (landlocked) countries. Examples include Burkina Faso, Mali and 
Niger (with migration to Ivory Coast, but also towards Nigeria and Senegal); Lesotho and 
Mozambique (with migration to South Africa and Botswana); and Liberia, Sierra Leone,
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population to seek refuge in the neighbouring countries (e.g. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). In 
Latin America examples include such countries as Paraguay and Bolivia, from where, until 
recently, large numbers emigrated to Argentina; Nicaragua (with migration to Costa Rica); and 
Honduras (mainly migration to Mexico). Asian examples are Indonesia (with a population of 
more than one million in Malaysia) and Myanmar (with one million living in Thailand). There is 
also considerable migration from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam to 
destinations within the region. 
· Diasporic States (countries with a huge and dispersed overseas population, with a large 
number of expatriates)
The migrants originating from diasporic states are by far the most numerous. As a result of 
outmigration over a long time covering several generations, a substantial part of the population 
(including the elite) has now become dispersed over a large number of countries throughout the 
world. The numbers involved are impressive (in any event many times greater than the flow of 
south-north migration). The Asian diaspora is estimated at more than 70 million. The largest is 
the Chinese diaspora - over 35 million (widely dispersed over South East Asia, but also the rest 
of the world). The figure for India is 20 million, that for the Philippines over 7 million, and Korea 
has a diaspora of over 3.5 million. Other examples are Malaysia with a diaspora of 5 million, 
Vietnam (1 million) and Pakistan. The Latin American diaspora is estimated at over 25 million. If 
we ignore Mexico and the Caribbean (which are oriented mainly on the US) and Argentina and 
Ecuador (relatively strongly oriented on Italy and Spain), we find that the countries mainly 
concerned are Colombia, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela, from where a group of over 8 million has 
fanned out over a large number of countries: not only the US, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, 
Italy, Israel and Japan, but also over the neighbouring countries. African examples of diasporic 
states are South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya, but also on a more modest scale smaller countries 
such as Ghana, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gambia and the Cape Verde islands. 
The above classification (see Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006) makes clear that, where migration 
is concerned, it is no longer sufficient to divide the world into origin and destination regions and 
to connect the two groups with arrows to indicate the migrant and capital flows. There is a wide 
variety of ways in which countries are incorporated into the migration system. This has direct 
consequences for the possibilities of being able to profit from migration. Diasporic states and 
countries with directed South-North migration generally find themselves in a relatively 
favourable position, while the countries with south-south migration appear to be increasingly 
faced with fresh restrictions.
The most favourable are the circumstances of the diasporic states: thanks to migration 
over many generations, they can call on a considerable overseas population which they can use as 
development potential. They have not so much to suffer under restrictive policies; the majority of 
the migrants are already living in the reception region and are, more or less, successfully 
integrated, so that they have relatively good possibilities for investment. Countries with South-
North migration enjoy the advantage that they are clearly in the picture and can relatively easily 
negotiate about projects, readmission or migrant quotas. They sit close to the fire compared with 
other countries and so are able to profit from temporary requirements for migrant labour.
This stands in contrast to the countries with mainly South-South migration, which are 
largely at the mercy of the policy of receiving countries in their own region (often therefore 
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problems; where problems of discrimination or xenophobia (which also arise in the north) remain 
relatively invisible, because the media pay attention mainly to tensions in the northern countries
(see for further details report 14).
Migration routes and recent trends 
The heterogeneity of migration finds expression in a great variety of migration routes (see van 
Moppes 2006; Spaan and van Moppes 2006; also Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006). 
If we analyse the dominant migration routes from sub-Saharan Africa to Fortress Europe 
(van Moppes 2006), just as the route through Mexico is the main route for most Latin American 
migrants on their way to the United States, there is a restricted number of gateways towards the 
EU. There are currently six main routes from sub-Saharan Africa, leading to three major 
departure areas, namely the Canary Islands (from Northern Mauritania, Western Sahara and 
southern Morocco); the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and parts of the Spanish mainland 
(from Northern Morocco); and Italy (Lampedusa, Sicily) and/or Malta (mainly from the Tunisian 
east coast and western parts of the Libyan coast)(see van Moppes 2006). 
The Spanish and Italian territories in and near Africa are thus the main destinations on the 
way to the EU. After all, arriving on one of these territories means actually landing in the 
European Union, which opens up a broad range of possibilities of other countries to go to. 
However, before migrants actually arrive in departure areas like airports, seaports and the coasts 
of different African countries, they have usually been on a long journey on the African continent 
in order actually to get there (see van Moppes 2006; also Spaan and van Moppes 2006). 
Migration patterns are becoming increasingly less transparent and are rapidly changing; 
radical changes have recently occurred in the direction and volume of migration. In the first place 
a reversal of migration has occurred in many countries: former emigration countries, such as 
Spain or Italy, and also Botswana, now act as both immigration and transition areas. Other 
examples are Nigeria and Kenya, which have developed from immigration into emigration areas 
(often in combination with assuming a role as a transit area (de Haas 2006; Rutten 2006). An 
increasing number of countries are affected not only by emigration or immigration, but are also 
the subject of both at the same time (e.g., Morocco, Senegal [Broekhuis and Ndione 2006]). 
Countries such as Rwanda, Kenya and Senegal increasingly act as transit areas. 
As a direct consequence of restrictive policies in the core regions (i.e., EU, US etc.) new 
transition zones and more specific migration hubs have arisen between the place of origin and the 
place of destination. Cities along the Sahara route, or places with direct boat and flight 
connection are attractive locations for people specializing in the migration business, and develop 
into migration hubs (van Moppes 2006). Migrants are confronted with rising costs and are 
increasingly vulnerable to exploitation (there seems to be a rapid increase in human trafficking 
and illegality). Moreover, restrictive policy (in the US, Europe, but also with the migrants’ own 
region) has led to an increasing diversity of origin and destination areas. Where previously, 
migration preferably took place along the more or less well-known routes, travel now preferably 
takes place to conventional destinations in order to evade tightened border controls as far as 
possible (for examples, see van Moppes 2006; Spaan en van Moppes 2006; Zoomers and van 
Naerssen 2006). Compared with previously, people now travel less often by air; whereas labour 
migration and trafficking to Europe used to predominantly use air links, visa requirements and 
increasing immigration controls at air and seaports, seem to have led to an increasing reliance on 
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Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006). 
Important changes have recently also occurred in the composition of the migrant flows. 
Whereas migration was for a long time a matter for men, significant portions of females now 
migrate independently to fulfil their own economic needs. In addition to feminisation, there is 
also rejuvenation of migration flows (Moppes 2006; Adepoju, van Naerssen and Zoomers 2006). 
Lastly, changes have occurred in the occupations and level of skill of migrants. While, 
formerly, many migrants were wage earners, now a considerable proportion consists of self-
employed entrepreneurs. There appears to be a shift towards higher skilled migrants, and 
migration is increasingly transnational (i.e., there is a growing group of transnational 
entrepreneurs who commute intensively in an attempt to profit from the economic opportunities 
which present themselves in several countries at the same time). 
Issues on the policy agenda: an overview
The crucial objective of our research was to analyse viewpoint and policy initiatives in the 
countries of origin. What are the issues that are currently on the migration agenda in the different 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and how is this linked to the performance of international 
migration? 
A summary of the experts’ meeting
Discussions during the experts’ meeting (Adepoju, van Naerssen and Zoomers 2006; van Moppes 
et al 2006) showed that migration policy in Sub-Saharan Africa appears to be a rather new policy 
field –the agenda is very diverse and unfolding gradually. While some countries are preoccupied 
with issues of human trafficking, others are exploring ways to make a more productive use of 
remittances, and the contributions the diaspora can and does make to home-country 
developments. There are important differences in the way countries deal with problems of ‘brain 
drain or brain gain’. Some countries are actively involved in how to retain people or to bring 
them back, whereas others are actively trying to locate and lure their experts into strategic 
positions in order to generate development benefits. Despite the fact that migration is an age-old 
topic, and that much research has been done during the last decades, it is not a consolidated 
policy field (see Adepoju, van Naerssen, Zoomers 2006)
During the meeting, the following issues were raised (and presented as recommendations
for the UN high - level dialogue in New York): 
General
Migration needs to be tackled as a global issue. It is no longer logical to make a distinction 
between sending–receiving and/or transit country as most countries have to deal with these three 
dimensions at the same time. Its dynamics and interconnectivity can best be appreciated when 
migration is perceived as a system (rather than focusing only on specific flows such as South-
North migration)
Current attempts to optimise the link between migration and development should not focus on 
South-North migration. The bulk of migration is taking place in the South. Such South-South 
migration is also taking place among the world’s demographic giants in, and inherent in the 
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hidden dimension.
Circular migration
Circular migration is being flagged as a win-win situation provided that sufficient attention is 
given to how to prevent brain drain and stimulate brain gain. The circular migration debate is 
presented as a strategy for coping with the urgent labour needs in the destination countries of the 
North. The possibilities to use circular migration as a solution to the urgent labour needs in the 
South should be systematically explored. In that context, the free circulation of workers in sub-
regions should be promoted.
Remittances
Remittances are private transfers to families to alleviate poverty. Governments of receiving 
countries should endeavour to provide the enabling environment to facilitate the productive use 
of remittances. To strengthen the development impact of remittances, the costs of migration 
(recruitment fees and documentation), the cost of remitting and the costs of loans should be 
reduced, while also ensuring a more facilitating investment environment.
Migration of skilled professionals and ethical recruitment
Emigration of skilled professionals hampers the attainment of Millenium Development Goals, 
especially in the health sectors of poor countries. The direct recruitment of professionals 
undertaken by the countries of destination by means of unfair competition should be discouraged. 
For the time being, the North decides how many workers to recruit and from where and often 
unilaterally selects the best workers in the international market.
The countries of destination should be promoting a shared responsibility with the countries of 
origin concerning local need in terms of professionals (education and training) and in the spirit of 
co-responsibility, help to foster local development of the countries of origin to reduce poverty 
and to create domestic employment.
“Compensation” for the brain drain may take the form of supporting projects involving 
professionals going back to their country of origin for short periods to work in public structures, 
special programmes and education. At any rate, there is a clear need to promote bilateral (and/or 
regional) agreements for the mutual recognition of titles and accreditation.
Diaspora 
The countries of origin should invest more in strengthening linkages with their diaspora 
communities, involving and promoting the migrant associations overseas, offer cooperation and 
assistance to well-established NGOs managing the philanthropy arising from diaspora locally and 
transnationally, by reducing unnecessary taxes and bureaucratic delays. The best practices should 
be documented and officially recognised. They should also provide infrastructural facilities and 
concrete opportunities for overseas nationals to invest in their country, promote the active 
involvement of the local communities in order to strengthen the self-development potential 
develop and implement reintegration programmes for returnees to foster the possibilities of 
investment and entrepreneurship. The countries of destination could help to facilitate such 
processes.
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Countries of origin and destination should promote migration governance, including data, 
monitoring, assistance and protection of migrants. Migration policies are international by 
definition and should be discussed at regional, bi-regional and multilateral levels in order to 
establish a common standard of protection and promote policy coherence in migration 
management. Countries should take responsibility to ban rights violations such as trafficking and 
xenophobia. More attention should also be paid to the impact of images –presentation of 
information –and the media.
Field missions
The conclusion that ‘migration is not a consolidated policy field’ and ‘ that the agenda is very 
diverse’ (see Adepoju, van Naerssen, Zoomers 2006) was largely confirmed during the field 
missions to Nigeria, Senegal and Burkina Faso, Kenya and Rwanda (see de Haas 2006; 
Broekhuis 2006; Broekhuis and Ndione 2006; Rutten 2006 and Muhoza and Rutayisire 2006, 
respectively).
We analysed the present situation in different countries, beginning with the analysis of 
agendas in countries with predominantly south-south migration (Rwanda, Burkina Faso), then 
countries with predominantly South-North migration (Senegal), ending with the countries 
classified as diasporic states (Senegal, Nigeria and Kenya, including China, India, the Philippines 
etc). It is interesting to note that there is a kind of continuum in the migration agendas of the 
different countries (see Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006 for the complete overview). 
Reviewing migration as a policy issue, and summarising the types of programmes that are 
currently under way, we can say that they are usually a combination of the following measures. 
(Some of the measures are supported by Dutch development cooperation (indicated in the listing 
by **).
Policy priorities in the sending countries (also prioritised on the migration and development 
agenda of receiving countries/ donor agencies)
- Increasing the flow of remittances/ ensuring a more productive investment of the money 
through forms of co-financing (co-development in West Africa/ Tres por Uno in Mexico).
- **Measures aimed at encouraging brain gain and limiting brain drain; encouragement of 
return often linked to northern programmes (MIDA, TOKTEN; in Senegal, Ghana, and 
also Burkina Faso). 
- ** Capacity strengthening/ improvement of border controls, intended to limit immigration 
from neighbouring countries. Investments are made within the framework of this policy 
and with financing from northern countries in the training of customs officials and 
equipment to sharpen border controls. 
- ** Combating human trafficking (mainly of women and children, partly linked to the 
problem of forced labour). Many anti-trafficking policies are financed and carried out in 
collaboration with donors/ receiving countries (including the ILO). 
9Policy priorities in the sending countries together with the diaspora (partly supported by 
receiving countries/ donor agencies). 
- The institution of a ministry of diaspora/ minister for diaspora (starting initiatives in 
Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Rwanda, Argentina); intensifying contacts with the population 
overseas. 
- Starting up cultural programmes etc.; spreading information; granting the franchise to the 
population in the diaspora. (is currently being discussed in several countries, including 
Kenya and Nigeria)
- Programmes aimed at improving the investment climate – aimed at attracting investment, 
e.g. by offering tax concessions etc. (examples: China, India and Korea; starting in 
Senegal). 
Policy priorities in de sending countries (not on the migration and development agenda of 
receiving countries/ donor agencies)
- Protection of the rights of migrants; the ILO Convention on Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and their Family Members (not ratified by most of the northern 
countries)
- How to create youth employment (e.g. in Senegal, Burkina)? Part of conventional 
development policies, but not on the migration and development agenda.
- Encouragement of immigration and return, e.g. in Rwanda. Forms part of the refugee 
agenda, but usually from the perspective of the reception region.
- Exporting the labour surplus /the development of remittance corridors. In different 
countries active attempts are made to facilitate emigration (providing services/institutional 
reforms) while an attempt is made to maximise the positive effects (e.g. the Philippines, 
Kenya, Ecuador)
- Reducing the dependency on remittances/ promoting a greater stability (Cape Verde, 
Kenya); not on the migration and development agenda of donors.
Policy priorities in the receiving countries/ donors (not so much in line with priorities in sending 
countries).
- **Encouragement of circular migration (is presented as a win-win situation, because it 
makes migration possible without the threat of an invasion).
- Anti-migration campaigns/ information to make people aware of risks and dangers. 
Emphasis is placed in discussions in the receiving countries, and by donors, on the need 
to stop the brain drain (not often referred to in the sending countries) and the need to 
inform people about the risks of migration (in the sense of anti-emigration policy). 
- Policies for improving migration data. It is mainly from donor circles that resources are 
currently being provided for the provision of reliable information (migration statistics). 
Senegal is a pilot country in this respect (see Broekhuis and Ndione 2006).
- ** involvement of migrants - diaspora organisations. There has recently been a growing 
interest from the sending region in making contact with the diaspora. Governments in 
reception zones and donors are trying to involve migrants actively in the formulation 
and/or implementation of policy in their region of origin. 
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African diaspora organisations in the Netherlands
During our research, while focusing on the perspective of the sending countries, we also 
interviewed migrant and diaspora organisations in the Netherlands (see van Naerssen et al 2006) 
in order to learn more about their views and perceptions, and to explore the opportunities for the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to link with development-oriented MOs in the Netherlands in order to 
optimise the contribution of MOs to local, regional and national development in the countries of 
origin (see van Naerssen et al 2006; Kusters et al 2006).
The following recommendations were made to improve the performance of African MOs 
and their capacity to contribute to development processes (van Naerssen et al 2006; Kusters et al 
2006):
* During the past few years a dialogue has started between Dutch development agencies and 
MOs. Return migration and mostly small-scale projects (education and health care) are now on 
the agenda. The latter could be broadened by examining and encouraging social remittances, 
transnational entrepreneurship, private investments and tourism in countries of origin.  Special 
and careful attention should be paid to the opportunities for MOs to engage in programmes in the 
field of good governance and democratisation in the countries of origin. 
* Although they possess specific assets such as knowledge of foreign cultures and language-
skills, there is no reason to give MOs a privileged position in development cooperation and 
acquiring funding. The major criterion for funding should be the quality of the project/project 
implementation. The aim of development is not in the Netherlands, but  in the home countries of 
the MOs.
* Migrants have a relative advantage by being rooted in more than one society. This 
‘transnationalism’ offers a huge potential for development cooperation. This potential should be 
exploited, and optimised by dialogue, information on funding opportunities, capacity building 
programmes etc. Special attention should be paid to the second generation of migrants (and how 
to keep them involved).
* African MOs in the Netherlands are small and greatly rely on volunteer work.  While 
acknowledging the value of the volunteer work, Dutch Development Cooperation agencies could 
facilitate and increase the quality of the work of MOs by organising training and exchange of 
experience sessions; and also by supporting MOs in the monitoring and evaluation of projects 
and programmes currently carried out in Africa. This should preferably be done by independent 
institutions (i.e. not linked to the funding agencies).
* African MOs could learn lessons from Asian and Latin American MOs, in particular, with 
regard to lobbying the African national governments for migrants’ rights and facilitating social 
remittances. Lessons could also be learned from existing initiatives and programmes in other 
European countries.
* Projects of MOs in all African countries should be considered for funding and other forms of 
support (i.e., not restricted to the partner countries). 
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* The possibilities for ways of co-operation between Dutch development agencies, African MOs 
in the Netherlands and governments of the countries of origin should be explored and expanded. 
Apparent examples are the dialogues with the embassies of Ghana and Cape Verde. 
Final reflections
How can consistent migration policies contribute to combating poverty? At this moment, several 
‘sending’ countries are looking at ‘migration and development’, but there are several reasons why 
international migration will not automatically result in poverty alleviation or sustainable 
development (see Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006). 
Much will depend on the type of destination where migrants decide to go. People moving to the 
Gulf States will – in comparison with migrants who move to other destinations - have fewer 
possibilities for upward mobility than those who migrate to the US/Canada or the EU (and where 
conditions are better for establishment, family reunification, etc.).  Within the EU there are wide 
differences between countries in the possibilities for integration and becoming full citizens, 
which will determine to a large extent whether migrants will be able to benefit from migration or 
not.
At the country level, the development potential of migration will greatly depend on the way 
countries are incorporated into the migration system. This has direct consequences for the 
possibility of being able to profit from migration. Diasporic states and countries with directed 
South-North migration generally find themselves in a relatively favourable position, while the 
countries with south-south migration appear to be increasingly faced with restrictions. In the case 
of south-south migration, migrants often travel without the required documentation, they are 
vulnerable to exploitation – do not receive protection; job opportunities – as well as salaries - are 
usually unfavourable in comparison with the northern destinations; the flow of remittances is 
small in comparison with the flow of money coming from the northern states, and much of the 
suffering remains invisible.
To the extent that receiving states/ donors are currently implementing ‘migration and 
development’ policies, these are mainly aimed at controlling dominant patterns of south-north 
migration. The areas of origin are treated as ‘sending states’ without taking into account that 
many of these countries also play a role as immigration and/or transition areas. EU countries and 
a selected group of emigration countries are currently negotiating readmission and/or migration 
quotas (bilateral agreements), often without taking into consideration the negative consequences 
for intra-regional relations (i.e., restriction of migration from neighbouring states). 
In addition, there is another paradox: regional organisations (ECOWAS, AU etc.) aim at 
facilitating ‘free movement of persons’, but also acknowledge the need to control migration. 
Processes of regional integration seem to have given more space to human traffickers and have 
restricted the possibilities for states to control migration.
Restrictive policies – and more intensive border control in northern countries - have often been 
unable to solve the problem of illegal migration, but have – instead - resulted in a more complex 
situation. Migrants are forced to spend more money and time, take higher risks, and are more 
dependent on smugglers than before. The likelihood of international migration helping to combat 
poverty is less favourable than before. Migrants are increasingly attracted to criminal activities 
(to earn large amounts of money in a short time); the migration agenda has become mixed up 
with anti-terrorism; and human trafficking has intensified.
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International migration might have helped groups of people to escape from poverty, but the 
impact tends to limited, even in the most favourable circumstances. Where migrants do manage 
to send remittances to their areas of origin, these flows are usually geographically concentrated 
(and benefit only small numbers of people). Flows of remittances help to create ‘islands of 
wealth’, but will in many cases not contribute to ‘national’ development. Another problem is the 
variability of remittance flows and the lack of sustainability. Even if remittances are stable in the 
short run (first-generation migrants sending home significant amounts of money on a regular 
basis), this seems to be decline in the course of time (second or third generations often lose 
interest and feel less committed). Migration streams are often not so stable in the long run: the 
intensity and direction of migration will very much depend on economic growth, which will vary 
in time. 
Even though migration is nowadays described as a strategy aimed at spreading risk 
(common in the ‘new economics of migration theory’), it often results in new vulnerabilities. 
There is a considerable group of migrants who – due to migration - suffered downward social 
mobility: they fell ill (malaria), were involved in an accident or became victims of robberies or 
exploitation; well-educated women working as domestic servants will often not be able to fully 
exploit their capabilities. Another negative dimension of migration is the intensification of land 
conflicts and rising land prices (use of remittances for the purchase of land ). International 
migration – along with the liberalisation of land markets and the use of internet - has opened the 
door to a real estate boom. International migrants – and also tourism entrepreneurs – are 
increasingly appearing as a new category of absentee landowners.
Where attempts have been made by policymakers to maximise the positive impact of 
international migration or to restrict the negative implications, most of the sending countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa do not yet  have well-established policies (van derVeen 2006). It is a new 
policy field and there is a wide variety of topics which very much depend on the particular 
position of countries.
There is some overlap between the ‘migration and development’ agendas of northern and 
southern countries (increasing the flow of remittances, combating human trafficking, improving 
border controls, stimulating brain gain etc.) but this is very much dependent on the country under 
consideration; within the South, there are considerable conflicts of interests between countries.
Where northern countries or donors invest in ‘migration and development’ programmes 
(MIDA/TOKTEN) - the number of beneficiaries is small in comparison with the total migration 
flow. From the perspective of the sending countries, it seems unrealistic to expect migrants to be 
willing to return as long as there are no comparable employment or educational opportunities. In 
many sending countries, the focus is not so much on ‘return’; instead, policymakers are searching 
for ‘long distance’ types of support by migrant populations. While they accept that people should 
have a right to move freely, they aim to get the diaspora involved by inviting them to send money 
or make investments. In general terms, in donor policies there is a bias in favour of countries with 
south-north migration and little is done for the countries experiencing south-south migration.
Recommendations
In order to improve the development impact of international migration and to make international 
migration more relevant to development, we formulated the following recommendations
(Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006):
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Improvement of current policies (supported by donors and northern countries):
- Anti-trafficking measures (programmes to stop the trafficking of women and children) 
should continue to receive high priority (supported by sending and receiving countries). 
At the same time, however, the sending countries are unhappy that victims and traffickers 
are treated equally as criminals. Priority should be given to stopping the criminalisation of 
the victims (and to focusing more on the traffickers). Legalisation of the victims is seen as 
an important requirement making anti-trafficking more effective.
- Anti-migration policies and/or intensification of border controls as a strategy for 
restricting illegal migration is not effective. Rather than investing in strengthening border 
controls (capacity building, technology etc.), more attention should be paid to problems of 
‘overstaying’.
- Where receiving countries show an interest in facilitating circular migration, it is 
necessary to examine critically previous experiences (guest worker programmes) and the 
development implications of current migration towards the Gulf States. The ageing 
population in Europe might offer opportunities for Africans on the European labour 
market, but little is known about the particularities of future labour needs, and how such 
migration can help to promote essential productive investments and knowledge transfer. 
A better orientation towards the international labour market is needed if the country 
wishes to profit more from international migration. It is also important to anticipate better 
the growing competition between different migrant groups (how is it possible to guarantee 
that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa will be able in the long run to compete with 
migrants arriving from Asia and Latin America?).
- It is recommended that an analysis be made of to what extent MIDA-TOKTEN initiatives
(aimed at brain gain/ brain circulation) form part of mainstream development policies 
(PRSPs and sectoral plans), and analyse to what extent these are in conflict with 
‘traditional structures’. What is the capacity of local institutions to facilitate 
‘reintegration’ and or the return of people, and what is the impact of ‘foreign expertise’? 
What kind of institutional adaptations are necessary (e.g., property rights, inheritance 
rights etc.).Who is responsible for the people moving in and out, and what are the social 
security implications for these groups? What are their rights and obligations of circular 
migrants and who is responsible (the government of the sending or the receiving
country)?
- Where support is given to migrant and diaspora organisations, it is important to also 
consider supporting such organisations in the countries of origin (e.g., in Burkina Faso 
there are numerous migrant organisations). Northern government and donors could 
continue to help migrant organisations to establish contacts with the area of origin, but 
also diaspora organisations in other countries, thus facilitating communication and 
information flows. (For more specific recommendations related to MOs in the 
Netherlands, see van Naerssen et al 2006).
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New orientations:
- Greater priority should be given to the problems of countries with South-South migration,
and to those of transition areas/ migration hubs (how to improve the situation of transit 
migrants? In doing this, sufficient attention should be paid to the Asian-African (and 
potentially Latin American) connection.
- More emphasis should be given to supporting national governments and/or local groups 
(in sending countries) to establish links with their diaspora. Many sending countries are 
interested in intensifying relations with countries with substantial migrants group, but the 
financial means of their governments are limited. 
- More attention could be paid to the worldwide problem of discrimination and xenophobia 
(including in the South). Rather than continuing data collection –and deepening the 
contrast between how migrant and non migrant populations get along  (as is currently 
done by different donors), it is necessary to make a critical review of the paradigms used 
(aliens, 'immigrants', expats) and to assess how, in different countries, this categorisation 
contributes to stigmatisation, exclusion etc.
- More attention should be paid to the negative implications of the boom in bilateral 
agreements (readmission, migration quotas) for the intra-regional patterns of collaboration 
and/or interstate relations within the south.
- Given the growing interest in circular migration (see above), it would be interesting to 
collect more concrete information about how to monitor ‘urgent labour needs’ (not only 
in the North, but also within the South in relation to HIV-AIDS etc.). How can we match 
demand and supply, and make circular migration more relevant to African labour 
requirements?
- Priority should be given to providing more and better information to different categories 
of migrant groups. How can we inform migrants before their departure about the 
conditions in host countries; inform women and children so that they do not become 
victims of traffickers, AIDS and other diseases; inform people about visa requirements 
etc. (and the need to formalise their presence); economic investment possibilities; 
assessing the future labour needs; obtaining information about new laws and international 
treaties. etc.
- It is urgent to initiate a discussion about the new role of embassies and consulates – they 
are currently providing visas and passports, but what is their future role in distributing 
information (see above); in providing assistance in the case of emergencies and 
expulsions; in preparing agreements to improve social security etc?
- More attention should be paid to the problems of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 
refugees, in particular the ‘ecological refugees’ (together with political conflicts, one of 
the root causes of forced migration). Early warning systems and spatial planning could 
help to prevent forced migration.
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- It is important to mainsteam ‘migration and development’ policies in the direction of anti-
poverty strategies. The current emphasis on ‘migration and development’ should not 
result in the reallocation of money in favour of the migrants. The majority of the 
population (97%) is geographically stable; they are quite reluctant to leave their homes 
and villages or towns. More explicit attention must be paid to how to control population
growth and/or improve local employment opportunities, especially for the youth.
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